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Abstract
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Po l i c y  Re s e a R c h Wo R k i n g  Pa P e R 4714
In recent years donor countries have committed to 
dramatic increases in the supply of foreign aid to 
developing countries. Meeting and sustaining such 
commitments will require sufficient support among 
donor country voters and taxpayers. The determinants 
of public opinion in donor countries on foreign aid have 
received little attention. This paper examines attitudes to 
foreign aid with a large, multi-level, cross-national study.  
It outlines a theoretical rationale for support for foreign 
aid, discussing the importance of both individual factors 
and economic and social structures. The theory is tested 
with multi-level models, including both individual-
level and country-level variables to predict positive 
This paper—a product of the Human Development and Public Services Team, Development Research Group—is part 
of a larger effort in the department to make aid more effective in promoting economic development. Policy Research 
Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at sknack@
worldbank.org.  
attitudes. Two datasets are used to measure attitudes in 
donor countries: (1) the 1995 World Values Survey has 
information from approximately 6,000 individuals in 
nine countries and asks a rich battery of questions at 
the individual-level, and (2) the 2002 Gallup “Voice of 
the People” survey asks fewer questions of individuals 
but includes 17 donor countries. Using both surveys 
combines their distinct strengths and allows tests of 
individual and national-level theories across disparate 
samples. The results generally support the predictions 
that attitudes toward aid are influenced by religiosity, 
beliefs about the causes of poverty, awareness of 
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provided by the World Bank’s Knowledge for Change Program.Foreign aid is an important issue for both developing and developed countries.  
Aid in the form of money, goods or technical assistance can develop infrastructure, 
strengthen institutions, or address humanitarian crises in recipient countries.  Foreign aid 
can exceed 10% of a recipient country’s national income in many instances (World Bank 
2005).  There is growing evidence that aid can produce positive outcomes, from 
democracy (Finkel, Pérez-Liñán, and Seligson 2007) to economic growth (Burnside and 
Dollar 2000; but see Roodman 2007).  Foreign aid can help donor countries as well.  In 
donor countries, foreign aid may be viewed as a strategic foreign policy tool (USAID 
2008).  When foreign aid is used by recipient countries to finance public goods, it can 
lead to welfare improvement in both the recipient country and in the donor country 
(Hatzipanayotou and Michael 1995).   
  The supply of foreign aid to recipients is influenced by public opinion in the 
donor countries.  Public opinion influences public policies of many types (Shapiro and 
Jacobs 2000; Jencks 1985; see Burstein 1998 for an excellent review).  In the area of 
foreign aid, Mosley (1985) demonstrates that states are influenced by citizens in 
determining the quantity (and quality) of distributed foreign aid.  Other theorists view 
foreign aid as a public good with a market (Dudley and Montmarquette 1976; Mosley 
1985).   
The level of public support for aid affects not only the quality of aid but also the 
effectiveness of each dollar spent on aid.  Paul Collier in his book, The Bottom Billion 
(2007: 183), asserts: “The key obstacle to reforming aid is public opinion” in donor 
countries.  Where there is relatively little support for aid, aid agencies are overly risk 
averse, according to Collier, and are constrained to deliver aid in sub-optimal ways – e.g. 
on projects that provide photo opportunities for politicians.  Aid in general may be more 
effective in reducing poverty when channeled through multilateral institutions such as the 
World Bank or the regional development banks, because national donor agencies such as 
USAID often must pursue diplomatic, commercial or other objectives that sometimes 
conflict with development objectives.  However, where public opinion is less supportive 
of aid, governments may be less willing to yield control over how it is spent to 
multilateral institutions.  Figure 1 depicts a strong relationship between support for increased aid in donor countries and the share of aid that countries funnel through 
multilateral agencies.
1 
For these reasons, it is important to understand public support for foreign aid.  
One existing study (Chong and Gradstein 2006) begins to explore the determinants of 
support for foreign aid.  But two important issues remain: (1) research remains at the 
individual level without considering the larger social and institutional structures in which 
public opinion is embedded, and (2) the range of factors, even at the individual-level, that 
could affect support for foreign aid remains underspecified.  In this paper, we argue that 
individual-level factors such as attitudes toward poverty, as well as country-level factors 
such as a country’s existing level of aid, could affect public opinion in support of foreign 
aid. 
We examine support for foreign aid with a multi-level, cross-national study.  We 
begin by outlining a theoretical rationale for the factors that should affect support for 
foreign aid, discussing the importance of both individual-level factors and country-level 
economic and social structures.  We introduce two separate datasets to examine attitudes 
to foreign aid in donor countries: (1) the 1995-1997 wave of the World Values Survey has 
information from approximately 6,000 individuals in nine countries and asks a rich 
battery of questions at the individual-level, (2) the 2002 Gallup International “Voice of 
the People” survey, asks fewer questions of individuals but includes seventeen donor 
countries
2.  We test our theory with multi-level models, including both individual-level 
and country-level variables to predict support for foreign aid.   
 
INDIVIDUAL AND CONTEXTUAL INFLUENCES ON SUPPORT FOR FOREIGN 
AID 
  Citizens of donor countries have opinions on the provision of foreign aid, defined 
as the transfer of capital or goods from one nation to another.  Individuals can support 
foreign aid disbursement by their country in general.  Individuals may also feel, 
marginally, that their country should provide more or less aid than current commitments.  
                                                 
1 Causation is not necessarily from public opinion to how it is allocated.  However, very few survey 
respondents are likely to know much about the share of aid channeled through multilaterals.  The most 
plausible interpretation is that support for aid gives policymakers more latitude to spend it in ways that 
further development goals rather than the donor country’s commercial, security or other goals.  
2 See www.worldvaluessurvey.org and www.voice-of-the-people.net. 
  2As argued by others (e.g., Mosley 1985), we assume that the electorate is capable of 
forming clear opinions about their demand for foreign aid.  Previous research has shown 
that public opinion about world affairs is structured and consistent (Chanley 1999; 
Shapiro and Page 1988; Page and Shapiro 1992; Hurwitz and Peffley 1987).  Indeed, 
previous work has demonstrated that individuals hold “stable, internally 
consistent…generalized beliefs” about global issues such as the trustworthiness of other 
nations (Brewer et al 2004).  Support for foreign aid can be seen as part of a general 
orientation to foreign policy labeled “cooperative internationalism” as opposed to 
“militant internationalism” (Witkopf 1990; Chanley 1999). 
 
Support for Foreign Aid: Individual Characteristics 
Characteristics of individuals are likely to impact support for foreign aid.  For 
example, the religiosity of respondents – their attendance at religious services and the 
importance of religion to them – is likely to increase support for aid.  Most religious 
teachings discuss relief for the poor.  Jewish and Christian Biblical teachings, for 
example, urge individuals and leaders to support the poor, the sick, widows, travelers, 
and orphans.  Proverbs 22:9 states: “Those who are generous are blessed, for they share 
their bread with the poor.”  Certainly, religion has been found to impact altruism of other 
types such as philanthropy (Wuthnow and Hodgkinson 1990) and trust (Delhey and 
Newton 2005; La Porta et al. 1997; Fishman and Khanna 1999), as well as a variety of 
economic attitudes (Guiso et al. 2003).  And surveys show that demand for aid is partly 
altruistic – individuals cite moral or humanitarian obligations to help others (Mosley 
1985, citing Bowles 1978).  In short, there are a variety of reasons to expect that those 
who are more religious will express greater support for foreign aid.   
In a similar manner, an individual’s position on poverty should influence their 
support for aid.  Individuals likely extrapolate from their beliefs about the poor, or their 
general ideological position, in making decisions about supporting the poor in other 
countries.  If individuals feel that the poor are lazy, or that they can easily escape poverty, 
then they are unlikely to support aid, either domestically or abroad.  The theoretical 
argument we make here is related to low-information rationality – that citizens use 
information shortcuts to allow opinions on politics even when they lack expert 
  3knowledge (e.g., Fiske and Taylor 1984).  Individuals “cope with an extraordinarily 
confusing world…by structuring view about specific foreign policies according to their 
more general and abstract beliefs (Hurwitz and Peffley 1987:114).  For example, 
economic individualism has been linked to attitudes about welfare policy (Feldman 
1983).  Overall, it is reasonable to assume that an individual’s position on the left-right 
political spectrum, or their attitudes about the poor in general, can help predict their 
attitudes about the provision of foreign aid.
3   
  Because foreign aid is exactly that – foreign – an individual’s attention to 
international affairs may also affect support for foreign aid.  Individuals with greater 
awareness of foreign and international affairs should be more likely to support foreign 
aid.  Not only would individuals with greater exposure to events outside their own 
country’s borders understand the issues facing other countries, they are more likely to be 
aware of the inequality that exists between (and within) countries.  Some existing 
evidence suggests that individual’s breadth of perspective matters for economic attitudes.  
For example, Mayda and Rodrik (2005) find that individuals who express stronger 
attachment to their neighborhood, county, region or nation are less favorable toward free 
trade than are respondents who express stronger attachment to their continent.  Other 
factors should also demonstrate breadth of perspective.  Certainly education and media 
exposure influences the views that individuals have of other nations (Page and Shapiro 
1992).  Certain occupations, such as being a teacher, or a member of the armed services, 
are more likely than others to expose individuals to international affairs.   
  A fourth theoretical perspective suggests that certain psychological 
characteristics, such as a sense of agency or trust in others, are also likely to affect 
support for foreign aid.  Personality traits are understood to develop early in the life 
course, influence both the perception and interpretation of events, and are generally 
stable, consistent, and enduring.  Political psychologists therefore argue that “the 
influence of basic traits such as anxiety, hostility, or low self-esteem should be both 
pervasive and distinctive, exerting a consistent and unifying pressure upon a wide range 
of responses” (Sniderman and Citrin 1971:402).  Indeed, Sniderman and Citrin (1971) 
                                                 
3 Individuals on the Left may also be more likely to view foreign investment and trade as exploitative, with 
foreign aid the only remaining tool for developed economies to help developing countries. 
 
  4find that self-esteem is related to isolationism.  Further, previous work links trust to 
public opinion about world affairs (Brewer and Steenbergen 2002; Popkin and Dimock 
2000: Uslaner 2002).  For example, Uslaner (2002:196) argues that those who trust have 
“greater comfort” with individuals unlike themselves, including those from other nations.   
  In discussing trust, it is worth noting that individuals can trust organizations and 
institutions as well as generalized others (Barber 1983; Giddens 1990; Paxton 1999; 
Brewer et al. 2004).  Trust in the government, for example, has been defined as a 
“general orientation toward the government predicated upon people’s normative 
expectations of government operation.” (Hetherington and Globetti 2002:254; Miller 
1974).  Apart from trust in individuals, trust in the government or international 
institutions is therefore another factor that could be important in an individual’s decision 
to support foreign aid.   
When an individual trusts government or other institutions, they perceive those 
institutions to be working well and evaluate them positively.  Those who distrust 
government are likely to advocate restricting its activities while those who trust the 
government should support its activities.  Institutional trust will matter for the support or 
rejection of any government activity, including foreign policy.  However, Hetherington 
and Globetti (2002) argue that trust in the government is particularly important when the 
benefits of the government’s activity accrue to others (as it would with foreign aid).  
Further, citizens who are confident in their government’s abilities are more likely to 
believe it can successfully intervene in other nations (Popkin and Dimock 2000).  And 
previous research has related pride in one’s country with more positive attitudes toward 
trade (Mayda and Rodrik 2005). 
Besides trust in the government, trust in international institutions, such as the 
World Bank, UN or international NGOs may also impact whether an individual feels that 
foreign aid funds will be used wisely or wasted (see also Brewer et al. 2004).  The issue 
is particularly relevant for citizens of donor countries who channel substantial amounts of 
aid through these multilateral institutions.  The United States channels only about one-
tenth of its aid through multilaterals.  In contrast, in most years Italy channels over one-
half of its aid through multilaterals.  Overall, nearly a quarter of Development Assistance 
  5Committee (DAC) members’ foreign aid is channeled through these institutions, making 
public trust in them particularly relevant. 
 Finally,  demographic and life-course factors should matter for support for 
foreign aid.  Gender is an obvious first candidate for consideration.  Women and men 
differ in their opinions across a range of policy preferences (see Kaufman 2006 for a 
review).  For example, women tend to be less militaristic and more opposed to war than 
men (Conover and Sapiro 1993).  Chong and Gradstein (2006) find no differences 
between the genders in looking across multiple donor countries.  However, there are 
significant gender differences within many countries, with men more supportive of aid in 
some countries and women more supportive in others.  There is no obvious explanation 
for these conflicting findings. 
  Income may also affect an individual’s support for foreign aid.  Those with higher 
incomes have the flexibility to take risks and this is likely to encourage trusting and 
altruistic behaviors of all kinds.  Generally, some research suggests that individuals 
structure attitudes on economic issues along the rich/poor class schema (Hamill, Lodge, 
and Blake 1985).  In testing foreign aid directly, Chong and Gradstein (2006) find that 
support for foreign aid increases with income.   
Another demographic factor that could change an individual’s attitude about 
foreign aid is the significant life-course event of having a child.  The direction of effect is 
unclear, however.  On the one hand, children may act to broaden an individual’s 
perspective, helping them be more sympathetic to others and thereby increase support for 
foreign aid.  On the other hand, parents may feel the need to focus resources on their own 
children and therefore favor more domestic policies over international ones. 
 
Support for Foreign Aid: Contextual Effects 
  To this point, we have focused on individual-level influences on support for 
foreign aid.  But the aggregate social and institutional features of a nation may also 
encourage or discourage support.  We must distinguish theory at the individual level 
(e.g., higher income increases support for foreign aid) from theory at the aggregate level 
(e.g., countries with higher GDP per capita display more support for foreign aid).  
  6Countries vary systematically on political, economic, and cultural characteristics, all of 
which could impact individual levels of support.   
To begin, at the national level, a country’s existing level of foreign aid could 
impact citizen opinion on foreign aid.  On the one hand, citizens in countries with high 
existing foreign aid allocations may express more support for foreign aid in general.  On 
the other, when considering marginal aid (the question of whether to increase foreign aid, 
as asked by Gallup International) citizens in countries with high levels of existing aid 
may express less support than citizens from other countries.  Relatedly, military spending 
may affect attitudes toward aid in donor countries.  Definitions of foreign aid often 
couple military and economic spending.
4  Where military spending is high citizens may 
feel that their country is fulfilling its global citizenship duties through enhancing security.  
While this logic is very likely to apply in the United States, it is also likely to matter in 
France, the U.K. and even Canada, which specializes in international peacekeeping. 
  Country population may matter as a country-level variant of the global awareness 
variables.  In smaller nations, a larger share of those one can interact with are foreigners, 
and the greater one’s awareness of foreign affairs.  In contrast, in countries with larger 
populations, citizens are able to assist “far-off” disadvantaged people without resources 
ever crossing national boundaries.  As an example, even if Americans know as much 
about the way people live 500 miles away as an Austrian or Spaniard does, the people 
500 miles away are still Americans, not Hungarians or Moroccans or Portuguese.  The 
size of a country – measured by population and area – almost inevitably makes larger 
countries more provincial.   
Similarly, citizens in donor countries with experience as a colonial power may 
have greater awareness about development issues in aid recipients.  A history as a 
colonial power indicates sustained contact with a developing country.  Citizens of 
colonial powers are likely to be better informed about events in the developing world, 
understand development issues facing other countries, and be aware of inequality 
between colonizers and the colonized.  These citizens may also feel a greater sense of 
responsibility for the welfare of people in ex-colonies and the rest of the developing 
world.  Citizens of colonial powers are therefore hypothesized to be more likely to 
                                                 
4 The standard data source on aid (the OECD DAC) excludes military aid. 
  7support foreign aid.  Finally, in an aggregate version of the income hypothesis discussed 
earlier, we might expect countries with higher aggregate incomes to demonstrate more 
support for foreign aid.   
 
DATA AND METHODS 
Data come two independent sources.  First, the World Values Survey (European 
Values Study Foundation and World Values Survey Association, 2006) contains 
individual-level demographic information as well as a wide range of questions capturing 
religiosity, an international focus, left/right position, and individual psychological 
characteristics.  The World Values Survey (WVS) includes information for 5,693 
individuals in 9 donor countries.
5  To measure the dependent variable, SUPPORT FOR 
FOREIGN AID, individuals answered the following question: “Some people favor, and 
others are against, having this country provide economic aid to poorer countries.”  It is 
coded with four response categories indicating increasing favor. 
The second survey is Gallup International’s Voice of the People 2002 survey. This 
survey contains many fewer individual-level variables than the WVS.  It contains 
demographic information, as well as questions about political interest and trust of 
individuals and various organizations.  The strength of the Gallup International (GI) 
survey is that it includes information for 6,194 individuals in 17 of the 22 possible donor 
countries.
6  To measure the dependent variable, GIVE MORE FOREIGN AID, individuals 
answered the following question: “Do you think that the wealthier nations should give 
more financial help to the poorer nations or are they giving enough now?”  It is coded 
1/0; or “should give more” / “giving enough.” 
 
Individual-Level Independent Variables 
  In the World Values Survey analyses, the individual-level independent variables 
correspond to the four theories outlined above.  Two variables in the WVS measure 
                                                 
5 The countries included in the WVS analysis are Australia, Finland, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, 
Norway, Spain, Sweden, and the United States.   
 
6 The countries included in the Gallup analysis are Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, 
Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States.   
  8religiosity: IMPORTANCE OF RELIGION ranges in four categories from “very important” to 
“not at all important.”  How often a respondent ATTENDS SERVICES is coded as days per 
year.   
Seven WVS variables capture a respondent’s attention to international affairs.  
Individuals who respond that they are a MEMBER OF THE WORLD are distinguished (1) 
from those who chose towns, regions, or countries (0).  NATIONAL PRIDE is measured in 
four categories from “very proud” to “not at all proud.”  INTEREST IN POLITICS is coded in 
four categories from the question, “How interested would you say you are in politics?”  
TELEVISION CONSUMPTION ranges from 0 hours of television viewing to over 3 hours per 
day.  Two occupations with an international focus are included: members of the ARMED 
FORCES and professional workers including LAWYERS AND TEACHERS.  Finally, 
respondents who were BORN IN COUNTRY are distinguished from all others. 
The WVS analyses also include four variables to measure Left/Right Position.  
First respondents were asked to place themselves on a 1 to 10 scale indicating their 
LEFT/RIGHT POSITION, where higher values indicate positions closer to the right.  Next, 
three variables capture traditional left/right views on poverty.  First, individuals who feel 
that others “are poor because of laziness and lack of will power” (POOR ARE LAZY = 1) 
are contrasted to those who believe others are poor because society treats them unfairly 
(0).  Individuals who believe the POOR CAN ESCAPE POVERTY (1) are distinguished from 
those who believe they have very little chance (0).  Finally, an individual’s assessment of 
whether there are MORE POOR today than ten years ago is coded in three response 
categories.   
Lastly, the WVS analyses include three psychological characteristics.  
Respondents indicated their SATISFACTION WITH THEIR FINANCIAL SITUATION on a 1 to 10 
scale with higher values indicating greater satisfaction.  AGENCY is also measured as a 1 
to 10 scale, with higher values indicating a feeling of “free choice and control.”  TRUST is 
assessed with the question, “generally, speaking, would you say that most people can be 
trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?” 
The WVS measures INCOME as quintiles within each country’s income structure.  
Three other demographic variables are included in the WVS analysis: a respondents AGE, 
whether the respondent is FEMALE, and whether a respondent has ANY CHILDREN.   
  9The Gallup International data contain fewer individual-level variables.  
Demographic variables record a respondent’s AGE, whether the respondent is FEMALE, 
whether the respondent is EMPLOYED, and an individual’s level of EDUCATION in three 
categories.  POLITICAL INTEREST in the GI survey is measured with a question asking 
whether the respondent had contacted any public officials to provide an opinion on a 
public issue (1) or not (0). 
More questions about individual trust are available in the GI survey.  TRUST is 
measured with the same question as in the WVS survey -- “generally, speaking, would 
you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with 
people?”  But the GI survey also asks whether individuals feel “this country is run by a 
few big interests looking out for themselves, or that it is run for the benefit of all the 
people” (RUN FOR BIG INTERESTS).  Further, GI asks individuals about their trust in a 
variety of specific institutions: TRUST IN GOVERNMENT, TRUST IN THE UNITED NATIONS 
AND THE WORLD BANK, and TRUST IN NGOS (non-governmental organizations such as 
environmental or social advocacy groups).  The trust in institutions variables are coded 
along a four category scale, from “a lot of trust” to “no trust at all.” 
 
Contextual-Level Independent Variables 
Analysis is restricted to the 22 donor countries that are members of the 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC).  Of these, 19 appear either in our analysis of 
WVS data (2), Gallup data (10), or both (7).  Belgium, France, and Greece are missing 
from both surveys.   
Country-level variables are all taken from the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators dataset.  Data correspond to 2002 in analysis of the GI data, and to 1995 for 
the World Values Survey analysis.  ODA is measured as Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) as a share of GNP, or alternatively on the basis of aid in dollars per 
capita, using aid data collected by the OECD-DAC (Development Assistance 
Commission).  Income per capita is measured using the purchasing power parity 
adjustments.  MILITARY SPENDING is measured as a share of GNP.  In adding up (and 
logging) the number of former COLONIES, we consider only the most recent colonizing 
power (e.g. Philippines counts as an American, not Spanish colony).   
  10Table 1 lists the country-level variables for the larger 17-nation GI sample, the 
percentage of survey respondents in each country supporting increased aid, and the 
percentage of survey respondents who favor aid only to non-corrupt countries.  
Interestingly, the percentage of respondents who favor aid only to non-corrupt countries 
is always less than the % who favor aid in general, except in the United States.  Table 1 
also provides level-2 summary statistics for the GI sample.  These rows demonstrate 
considerable variability across countries in all of these variables, including support for 
foreign aid. 
Table 2 provides bivariate correlations among support for aid and the country-
level independent variables.  Two of the significant correlations in this table show that 
survey respondents in larger countries tend to be less supportive of increasing aid, even 
though larger countries already tend to provide less aid.  Larger countries tend to spend a 
larger percentage of national income on the military, consistent with collective action 
theories of Olson (1965) and Olson and Zeckhauser (1966).  Richer countries tend to 
provide more aid.   
 
The Multi-Level Model 
To test the theories outlined above, we use multilevel models that simultaneously 
estimate individual- and country-level effects.  The data in both surveys are hierarchically 
organized with individuals nested within countries, and information at the both the 
individual level and the country level is used to determine support for foreign aid.  We 
use the statistical package HLM 6.04 for the analyses (Raudenbush, Bryk, Cheong, and 
Congdon 2001).   
For the WVS analysis, the full specification of level one of the multi-level model 
is: 
yij = β0j + β1j FEMALE + β2j AGE + β3j ANY CHILDREN+ β4j INCOME+ β5j 
IMPORTANCE OF RELIGION + β6j ATTENDS RELIGIOUS SERVICES+ 
β7j MEMBER OF THE WORLD + β8j NATIONAL PRIDE+ β9j 
INTEREST IN POLITICS+ β10j TV CONSUMPTION+ β11j BORN IN 
COUNTRY+ β12j MILITARY+ β13j LAWYERS AND TEACHERS + β14j 
LEFT-RIGHT POSITION + β15j POOR ARE LAZY + β16j POOR CAN 
  11ESCAPE + β17j POOR GROWING + β18j AGENCY+ β19j 
SATISFACTION WITH FINANCES + β20j TRUST 
where yij is respondent i in country j’s attitude to foreign aid.  Preliminary random-
coefficients models (not shown) indicated that female, age, any children, income, 
member of the world, political interest, TV consumption, born in country, military, 
lawyers and teachers, and satisfaction with finances did not vary and were therefore 
fixed.  All other coefficients were estimated as random (allowed to vary across 
countries).  
  In the GI analysis, support for foreign aid is a 0/1 variable so we use a Bernoulli 
distribution with a logit link function for estimation.  The full specification of level one of 
the multi-level model is: 
Log[pij/(1-pij)] = β0j +β1j FEMALE + β2j AGE + β3j EMPLOYED+ β4j EDUCATION+ β5j 
POLITICAL INTEREST+ β6j TRUST + β7j RUN FOR BIG INTERESTS + 
β8j TRUST NGOS 
where pij is the probability that respondent i in country j supports giving more foreign aid 
(GIVE MORE FOREIGN AID =1).  Preliminary random-coefficients models indicated that 
employed and political interest did not vary and were therefore fixed.  All other 
coefficients were estimated as random.  
In analyses of both surveys, the specification of the first country-level model is: 
β0j = γ00 + γ01 ODA + u0j  
With only 9 countries in the WVS analysis, the level-two variables are included 
sequentially.  Subsequent level-two models include GDP, MILITARY SPENDING 
POPULATION, AND LOG COLONIES in place of ODA.  In GI, the same level-two variables 
are assessed.   
In both the WVS analyses and the GI analyses, all non-dummy individual-level 
independent variables are grand-mean centered, creating a variable with a mean of zero 
across all the cases.  Grand-mean centering holds compositional differences in individual 
characteristics constant and is appropriate when aggregate versions of the variables are 
not included in the model.  Weights are included to compensate for sampling issues in the 
GI analyses.  HLM 6.04 uses a weighting technique developed for hierarchical data 
(Pfefferman et al. 1998). 
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Calculating the ICC demonstrates that approximately ten percent of the total 
variance in support for foreign aid can be attributed to between-country differences (7% 
in the WVS and 13% in GI).
7  Thus, a nontrivial amount of the variance in support occurs 
across countries and it is important to explain this variation as well as the variation within 
countries.  Indeed, a simple ANOVA indicates that there is statistically significant 
country-level variance in support for foreign aid in both analyses.  That is, support for 
foreign aid varies a significant amount across countries. 
We begin our discussion of the results with the WVS analyses.  Table 4 tests 
individual-level theories of support for foreign aid.  These five models consider only 
individual-level effects but account for the clustering of individual respondents within 
countries with a random coefficients regression model (Bryk and Raudenbush 1992:20). 
A preliminary look across the models in Table 4 suggests that all four theories of 
individual differences in support for foreign aid find some support.  First, although the 
IMPORTANCE OF RELIGION to an individual does not have a significant effect on support 
for foreign aid, ATTENDING SERVICES does have a positive and significant effect.  Using 
the coefficient from model 2, compared to those who never attend religious services, 
individuals who attend at least weekly are expected to increase their support for foreign 
aid by .21, which across the dependent variable’s four response categories is 
approximately ¼ of a standard deviation.
8   
  Variables to assess an individual’s attention outside their own country find mixed 
support in Table 2.  Individuals who respond that they are a MEMBER OF THE WORLD are 
significantly more likely to support foreign aid than those who state that they are a 
member of a town, region, or country.  INTEREST IN POLITICS is coded in four categories 
from the question, “How interested would you say you are in politics?” and has the 
largest effect size among this set of variables.  If an individual were to increase their 
interest in politics from the lowest level (not at all interested) to the highest level (very 
interested) their support for foreign aid would increase by .36, or approximately ½ a 
                                                 
7 For Gallup, an ICC approximation for binomial models is used (Snijders and Bosker 1999:224).   
8 Auxiliary models revealed no differences across denominations in support for foreign aid. 
  13standard deviation.  TELEVISION CONSUMPTION has a significant but small effect on 
support for foreign aid, at least in the range considered in the WVS.  Individuals who 
increase their television by an hour per day increase their support for foreign aid by .04.  
Finally, professional workers including LAWYERS AND TEACHERS are more likely to 
support foreign aid than individuals in other occupations while those who are BORN IN 
COUNTRY are less likely to support foreign aid than those born outside the country.  The 
other variables intended to measure attention outside an individual’s country, NATIONAL 
PRIDE and ARMED FORCES do not significantly impact attitudes toward aid.   
 L EFT/RIGHT POSITION has a significant effect on support for foreign aid.  A one 
standard deviation change toward the right (approximately 2 units on the 1 to 10 scale) 
decreases individual’s support for foreign aid by approximately .08.  The three other 
variables assessing left/right position have very similar effect sizes although only POOR 
ARE LAZY and POOR CAN ESCAPE Poverty have statistically significant effects.  For 
example, if an individual agrees with the statement that others “are poor because of 
laziness and lack of will power” their support for foreign aid diminishes by .12.   
  Of the three psychological characteristics assessed in the final model, TRUST has 
the largest effect size.  Individuals who trust support foreign aid more than individuals 
who do not trust others.  The effect size is approximately ¼ of a standard deviation on the 
dependent variable.  SATISFACTION WITH FINANCIAL SITUATION also has a statistically 
significant effect, but a smaller effect size.  It would take movement from the bottom of 
the scale of satisfaction (1) to the top of the scale (10) to reach an equivalently sized 
effect. 
  Finally, the demographic variables indicate differences in support for foreign aid 
by gender and age.  Women support foreign aid more strongly than men, although the 
effect size (.06) is small.  Increasing age decreases support for foreign aid, but again the 
effect size is quite small – a ten year increase in age would only lead to a .02 decrease in 
support.  INCOME also predicts support in four of five models.  Once psychological 
characteristics are included in the model, however, the effect size of income is 
approximately halved and it loses statistical significance.  Having children is unrelated to 
support for aid. 
  14The more limited individual-level Gallup International results are generally 
consistent with the level-1 findings from the WVS.  For example, Table 5 reveals that 
women are more supportive of wealthier nations giving more financial help to poorer 
nations.  Remembering that the dependent variable in the GI analysis is a dichotomous 
variable (“should give more” / “giving enough”), interpretation of effect sizes requires 
transformation of the estimated coefficient.  For example, in models 5, compared to men, 
being a woman is expected to increase the odds of favoring more aid by 35% 
((EXP[.30×1]-1)×100).  An alternative interpretation focuses on the change in the 
predicted probability of favoring more aid.  An unemployed male, who has never 
contacted a public official, does not trust NGOs, and has average education, age, etc. has 
a predicted probability of favoring aid of .72 (calculated by: 1/(1+EXP-[.95])).  If that 
individual were instead female, her predicted probability would be .78, leading to a 
change in the predicted probability of .06 – a fairly strong effect. 
  Although the GI survey has fewer individual-level variables in general, it does 
have an expanded set of questions on trust.  As in the WVS analysis, TRUST has a 
positive and significant effect on support for more foreign aid.  Declaring trust in others 
increases the odds of favoring aid by approximately 50%.  Models 3-5 show substantial 
differences in the effect of trusting particular institutions -- GOVERNMENT, THE UNITED 
NATIONS AND THE WORLD BANK, and NGOS.  Trust in one’s own government does not 
significantly increase an individual’s support for aid.  Contrast the lack of effect of trust 
in one’s own government to the significant, but small, effect of trust in international 
donor institutions (the UN and World Bank) and the significant and large coefficient for 
trust in NGOs.  Each one-unit increase in expressed trust in international donors leads to 
a 7% increase in the odds of favoring more aid to poor countries.  Each one-unit increase 
in trust in NGOs, however, leads to a 57% increase in the odds of favoring more aid to 
poor countries. 
  Table 6 introduces country-level effects on support for foreign aid as well as the 
individual-level effects.  Theory suggests that existing levels of aid from donor countries 
may have differing effects in the WVS and GI analyses, i.e. the ODA coefficients may 
have opposite signs.  The WVS question asks respondents whether they favor provision 
of economic aid to poor countries, while the GI question asks whether wealthy nations 
  15should increase such aid.  To the extent policies reflect public preferences, existing ODA 
levels should be positively associated with support for aid in the WVS analysis, with 
causation going mostly from preferences (i.e. support for aid) to policy (i.e. levels of 
ODA).  In the GI analysis, in contrast, high levels of existing aid may reduce support for 
further increases in it, producing a negative coefficient on ODA.
9 
Coefficients on ODA in Table 6 are consistent with these arguments.  Although 
they are not significant at conventional levels, the ODA coefficient is positive in the 
WVS analysis and negative in the GI analysis.  In the GI analyses it becomes highly 
significant if two outlying cases, the U.S. and Japan, are dropped (new coefficient = -
1.41).  Interpreting this effect size suggests that if a country were to increase from an 
average level of foreign aid, about 0.5% of GNP, to 0.75% of GNP, the odds of a 
citizen’s support for foreign aid would decrease by 30%.  So there is some evidence for 
the hypothesis that citizens in countries with high levels of existing aid express less 
support for increasing aid than citizens from other countries. 
Across both surveys, the GDP of a society has a significantly negative effect on 
support for foreign aid.  A $1000 increase in income per capita is expected to decrease 
the odds of individuals in that country supporting foreign aid by 4%.  A one standard 
deviation change in income per capita ($6,500 in GI) leads to a 23% decrease in the odds.  
Interestingly, therefore, in contrast to the generally positive effect of socio-economic 
status on support for foreign aid at the individual-level, in the aggregate, richer countries 
do not exhibit greater support for foreign aid.  
  The results for military spending differ across the WVS and GI analyses.  Military 
Spending negatively effects support for foreign aid in the smaller WVS sample, but not in 
the larger GI sample.  Even using the WVS, however, this finding is highly sensitive to 
inclusion of the United States.  The coefficient on Military Spending is substantially 
reduced and becomes non-significant if the U.S. is removed from the analysis.  Although 
U.S. citizens may view their country as fulfilling its global citizenship duties through its 
                                                 
9 If preferences over aid levels were a sufficiently important determinant of actual aid levels, variations in 
aid levels among donor countries could merely reflect variations in the preferences of their respective 
median voters.  Under this strong assumption, we should observe, in each donor country in the GI survey, a 
roughly equal number of respondents favoring increases and decreases in aid.  In most countries, however, 
far more respondents support increasing than decreasing aid. 
 
  16high military spending, this hypothesis does not generalize to other countries. 
In support of a “global awareness” perspective, citizens in countries with larger 
populations show reduced support for foreign aid.  The WVS and GI samples both show 
a significant negative effect of population size on support for foreign aid.  That is, in 
countries with larger populations citizens appear less willing to assist disadvantaged 
people across national boundaries.  But the WVS result is again heavily influenced by the 
United States – the coefficient is approximately halved and loses significance if the U.S. 
is removed from the analysis.  The GI analyses are also influenced by the U.S., but to a 
lesser extent.  There, the coefficient remains largely stable but loses significance, 
reaching only p<.10. 
  Finally, we see the more expansive colonial powers exhibit greater support for 
foreign aid.  A 10% increase in number of former colonies is expected to increase the 
odds of individuals in that country supporting foreign aid by 2%.  While not an extremely 
strong effect size, it can make a substantial difference in countries that have colonized 
many countries, namely the U.K., France, and Spain.  Increasing colonies by 50% is 
expected to increase the odds of individuals in that country supporting foreign aid by 
12%.
10 
Overall, we see that both individual-level and contextual-level variables have 
effects on support for foreign aid.  At the individual level, we find some support for all 
five theoretical perspectives: demographic factors matter, as does religion, attention 
outside one’s country, left/right position and attitudes toward poverty, and psychological 
characteristics.  At the aggregate level, national aid disbursement impacts public opinion, 
as does GDP and links to former colonies. 
 
                                                 
10 Auxiliary analyses considered other country-level variables, including income growth rates, income 
inequality, foreign-born, exports, unemployment, tax revenue, and estimates of private charitable giving.  
In some cases the variable was not significant in either survey, e.g., exports measured as a share of GDP.  
Other variables were significant in one survey and not another.  For example, the percent foreign born 
(including refugees) was negative and significant in GI and non-significant in the WVS.  In some cases, 
results for these variables were significant but with differing signs in the two surveys.  For example, the 
average growth rate for the preceding 5 years has a positive effect in the GI sample, but negative in the 
WVS sample.  Similarly, income inequality (measured by the Gini coefficient) was positive for the GI 
countries, but negative for the WVS sample.  Chong and Gradstein (2006) obtained a similar negative 
effect of inequality using the WVS, but it is contradicted by findings from the larger GI sample.   
  17CONCLUSION 
  In this paper, we investigated public attitudes toward foreign aid across 19 donor 
countries.  We argued that both individual- and country-level factors contribute to 
support for foreign aid.  Using data from two sources, the World Values Survey, and the 
Gallup International Voice of the People Survey, we tested theories using multilevel 
models.  Using two surveys allowed us to combine their distinct strengths and provide 
tests of our individual- and national-level theories across disparate samples. 
Like the sole previous study on this topic (Chong and Gradstein 2006), our paper 
demonstrates that individual-level factors matter to support for foreign aid.  But this 
paper goes beyond a focus on demographic variables to test hypotheses related to a 
respondent’s religiosity, attitudes about poverty, attention to international affairs, and 
psychology.  Models provide support for all four proposed theories.  For example, in the 
WVS, individuals who attend religious services, watch TV, believe the poor can escape 
poverty, and trust others are more likely to support foreign aid.  Of note in the GI survey, 
individual trust in the United Nations and the World Bank appears more important to 
support for foreign aid than trust in one’s own government.   
  Apart from these individual-level effects, the paper highlights the contextual 
embeddedness of attitudes about foreign aid.  The country-level results suggest that 
wealth and existing development support matter for individual support of aid.  For 
example, citizens in countries with high levels of existing aid express less support for 
increasing aid.  Citizens from countries with a history of colonization also express more 
support for foreign aid on average. 
  In many ways the United States appears exceptional in these analyses.  It is also 
the most important donor to understand, as the largest economy but with a relatively low 
level of aid as a share of national income.  The United States spent about 0.16 percent of 
gross national income (GNI) in 2007, compared to the average of 0.45% among the 22 
DAC members.
11.  If U.S. aid as a share of GNI had been equal to that of France - the 
median value among the other 21 DAC members – total DAC aid in 2007 would have 
been increased by nearly one-third, from $103.7 billion to about $136 billion.  Increasing 
U.S. aid is challenging however in the face of low public support.  Only 55.5% of 
                                                 
11 See DAC data on ODA for 2007 at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/27/55/40381862.pdf. 
  18American respondents in the WVS favored providing aid to poorer countries.  Support in 
the other 8 donor countries in the WVS ranged from 69.3% (New Zealand) to 88.5% 
(Japan).  Despite its relatively low levels of aid-giving, support for increasing aid, as 
measured in the GI survey, was also lower in the U.S. (tied with Japan at 45%) than in 
any of the 17 donor countries included in that survey.  Our results can partially explain 
low support for aid in the U.S., but it remains somewhat of a mystery. 
The United States is an influential case for some of our level-2 variables; it is 
responsible for the negative coefficients for military spending and population size in the 
World Values Survey analysis.  Military spending as a share of national income for the 
U.S. is about three times as high as for the other DAC donors collectively.  Many 
Americans may view their international policeman’s role as a substitute for development 
aid.  The large size of the United States, both in population and in area, may reduce its 
citizens’ awareness of events and conditions in less-developed countries, and a reduced 
sense of responsibility for the welfare of poor people abroad.   
Another clue to U.S. exceptionalism in aid-giving may lie in the second question 
asked about aid in the GI survey.  The United States reports the highest percent of 
respondents who think no aid should be provided to countries with corruption problems.  
Indeed, the U.S. population is unique among the donor countries in its attention to 
corruption, being the only country where a higher percentage of respondents favor a more 
restrictive policy of giving only to non-corrupt countries.  Concerns about government 
corruption, along with stronger traditions of (and tax incentives for) private philanthropy, 
likely explain Americans’ relatively high levels of private giving to charitable 
organizations providing non-official aid.
12 
Numerous respondent-level attitudes and behaviors measured in the WVS were 
found to be associated with support for aid.  On several of those variables, Americans on 
the whole tend toward the extremes among the 9 donor countries represented in the 
survey.  However, some of these differences should increase support for aid among 
                                                 
12 Americans’ aid giving remains low by DAC standards even when private giving is included.  Americans 
give about 2% of their incomes to charities, and only about 2% of that amount goes to international 
charities, or .04% of income.  Adding this amount to U.S. ODA would not close most of the gap between 
U.S. and other donors’ aid/GNI levels, even if private giving in other donors is ignored.  Moreover, while 
private charitable giving is lower in other donor countries, a higher percentage of their charitable giving 
goes to international charities (Roodman and Standley, 2006). 
  19Americans while others should reduce it, with little net effect.  Low trust in people, right-
of-center ideology, and beliefs that the poor are lazy and can escape poverty are all 
significantly associated with lower support for aid.  Only 36% of Americans agree people 
can be trusted most of the time, lower than in 7 of the other 8 countries.  The U.S. ranks 
first in agreement that poor people are lazy and lack willpower; it ranks third in 
agreement that poor people can escape poverty, and in being right-of-center 
ideologically.  However, it also ranks at the top – by a wide margin – in church 
attendance, and above average on political interest and TV watching.  Those three 
variables are all associated with stronger support for aid giving.   
Satisfaction with one’s financial situation in the WVS analysis, and trust in NGOs 
and international institutions in the GI analysis, are also associated with greater support 
for aid.  The U.S. ranks in the middle among donor countries on these variables, so they 
cannot account for Americans’ low support for aid. 
It is possible that the implications of some of these attitudinal and behavioral 
variables differ across countries.  For example, interest in politics and TV consumption 
may increase Americans’ knowledge of foreign affairs and development issues less than 
it does in smaller countries.  Exploring these nuances is beyond the scope of this paper, 
however. 
  Foreign aid helps recipient countries develop infrastructure, strengthen 
institutions, and address humanitarian crises while providing an important foreign policy 
tool for donor nations.  Paul Collier, in his recent book on foreign aid, argues that 
improving the effectiveness of aid requires that donors be more willing to accept risks 
and hence a higher rate of failure.  But, “at present, the powerful force of public opinion 
is driving agencies in precisely the opposite direction.  They cannot afford failure....aid 
agencies are not run by fools; they are full of intelligent people severely constrained by 
what public opinion permits” (2007: 184).  Where support for aid is shallow and citizens 
are ill-informed about foreign affairs and development issues, “vociferous lobbies” may 
influence opinion and distort aid policies.  Better understanding the factors that influence 
public support for foreign aid can therefore only advance the quality of distributed 
foreign aid in the future. 
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Multilateral aid share is reported in World Bank (2007).  Support for increased aid is 
from the Gallup International “Voice of the People” survey for 2002.  
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Table 1. Gallup International “Voice of the People” 2002 Sample
Donor Country
% who favor 
more aid












Australia 63% 45% 0.25 26766 19.6 1.8 0
Canada 64% 48% 0.34 28307 31.4 1.2 0
Denmark 53% 42% 0.81 28814 5.4 1.5 0
Finland 61% 31% 0.46 26629 5.2 1.2 0
Germany 68% 30% 0.36 25579 82.5 1.5 0
Ireland 87% 40% 0.42 31478 3.9 0.6 0
Italy 83% 46% 0.29 25750 57.2 2 3
Japan 45% 18% 0.28 26106 127.4 1 3
Luxembourg 71% 26% 0.82 49861 0.4 0.8 0
Netherlands 50% 29% 0.82 28604 16.1 1.5 2
Norway 63% 40% 0.94 35219 4.5 2.1 0
Portugal 89% 43% 0.21 18398 10.4 2 7
Spain 91% 29% 0.27 23119 41.3 1.2 20
Sweden 69% 33% 0.94 27005 8.9 1.8 0
Switzerland 71% 42% 0.44 31204 7.3 1 0
United Kingdom 69% 43% 0.47 27897 59.3 2.5 59
United States 45% 53% 0.22 34669 288.4 3.4 4
Mean 67% 38% 0.49 29141 45.3 1.6 5.8
Standard Deviation 14% 9% 0.26 6665 71.5 0.7 14.6
Minimum 45% 18% 0.21 18398 0.4 0.6 0








Table 2. Correlations among country-level variables, Gallup International sample (N = 17)





Favor more aid -0.23 -0.23 -.45* -0.26 0.18
Aid/GNP 1 .48* -.45* -0.12 -0.15
GNP p.c. 1 0.03 -0.12 -0.17
Population 1 .62** 0.1
Military spending 1 0.34
* or  ** indicates significance at .10 or .01 level respectively for 2-tailed tests.  
 
  28Table 3. World Values Survey Individual-level Models
intercept 2.914 *** 2.948 *** 2.955 *** 2.944 *** 2.863 ***
(.075) (.08) (.073) (.069) (.079)
Demographic
female 0.071 ** 0.060 * 0.071 * 0.065 * 0.055 *
(.021) (.024) (.025) (.026) (.025)
age -0.001 -0.002 t -0.002 t -0.001 -0.002 t
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
any children -0.053 t -0.049 -0.030 -0.027 -0.008
(.028) (.028) (.027) (.028) (.028)
income 0.055 *** 0.057 ** 0.032 * 0.040 ** 0.022
(.014) (.014) (.011) (.013) (.013)
Religion
Importance of Religion 0.032 0.028 0.036 0.037
(.021) (.021) (.021) (.021)
Attends Services 0.004 * 0.003 t 0.004 * 0.003 *
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.001)
Attention outside country
Member of the World 0.170 ** 0.150 ** 0.146 **
(.047) (.045) (.048)
National Pride -0.023 -0.012 -0.018
(.024) (.023) (.021)
Interest in Politics 0.102 *** 0.096 *** 0.090 ***
(.015) (.015) (.015)
TV Consumption 0.052 ** 0.053 ** 0.044 *
(.013) (.015) (.014)
Born in Country -0.081 -0.093 t -0.094 t
(.055) (.049) (.049)
Armed Forces -0.093 -0.064 -0.029
(.159) (.148) (.15)
Lawyers and Teachers 0.164 *** 0.153 ** 0.126 *
(.037) (.041) (.044)
Left/Right Position
Poor are Lazy -0.117 t -0.119 *
(.054) (.051)
Poor Can Escape Poverty 0.134 ** 0.109 **
(.033) (.032)
Left / Right Position -0.044 *** -0.043 ***
(.009) (.008)









     t  .05 one-tailed; *  .05 two-tailed; **  .01 two-tailed; ***  .001 two-tailed
     Ni = 5,693   Nj = 9
Model 4 Model 5 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
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Table 4. Gallup Survey Individual-level Models 
intercept 0.86 *** 0.86 *** 0.93 *** 0.93 *** 0.95 ***
0.16 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.17
Demographic
education 0.23 * 0.23 * 0.12 0.12 0.06
0.09 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.08
female 0.27 ** 0.27 ** 0.30 ** 0.30 *** 0.30 **
0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08
age -0.01 * -0.01 * -0.01 * -0.01 * -0.01
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
employed -0.24 ** -0.24 ** -0.28 ** -0.28 ** -0.28 **
0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08
Political Interest
contacted public officials 0.00 0.02 0.02 -0.04
0.08 0.09 0.09 0.10
Trust
trust 0.42 *** 0.42 *** 0.39 ***
0.08 0.08 0.09




trust UN and WB 0.07 **
0.02
trust NGOs 0.45 ***
0.06
     t  .05 one-tailed; *  .05 two-tailed; **  .01 two-tailed; ***  .001 two-tailed
     Ni = 6,194   Nj = 17




  30 
Table 5. Country-level Results, World Values Survey and Gallup Survey 




GDP -4E-05 ** -4E-05 *
0.000 0.000







Log Colonies 0.024 0.218 *
0.045 0.100
     t  .05 one-tailed; *  .05 two-tailed; **  .01 two-tailed; ***  .001 two-tailed
      a Coefficient becomes significantly negative (-1.41, p<.001) if two outlying cases, the U.S. and Japan, are removed from the analysis. 
      b Coefficient is reduced and becomes nonsignificant if an outlying case, the U.S., is removed from the analysis. 
      c Coefficient is reduced and becomes nonsignificant if an outlying case, the U.S., is removed from the analysis. 
      d Coefficient is unchanged but reduces significance (p<.1) if an outlying case, the U.S., is removed from the analysis. 
     Note: All WVS models include the 20 variables at level 1.  All Gallup models include the 8 variables at level 1.   
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